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Abstract.  This analysis of British Ostpolitik focuses on Margaret Thatcher’s diplomacy, 
exploring her quietly pragmatic efforts to bring about a gradual transformation of Eastern Europe 
at the cost of supporting selected communist regimes. The analysis reveals how a market-
oriented economic experiment in Budapest first sparked the prime minister’s interest in Hungary 
and inspired her foreign policy in Eastern Europe. It documents the British search for a socialist 
transition “model”, which led to unprecedented diplomatic overtures towards a small enemy state 
on the brink of bankruptcy. Based on extensive archival research in Budapest and London, as 
well as on the personal recollections of three senior British diplomats, this case study challenges 
some of the common assumptions of the historical literature about Thatcher’s chosen method of 
combating communism and Britain’s long-term strategy towards the Eastern bloc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What was Britain’s role in the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the collapse of 
communism in Central and Eastern Europe? How far did Margaret Thatcher’s diplomacy 
contribute to the softening of Soviet power? Why did she encourage a prolonged socialist 
transformation instead of rapid regime change? This analysis addresses these questions through a 
case study of British engagement with Hungary, tracing the prime minister’s keen interest in 
Eastern European affairs to the three-day visit she made to Budapest on 2–4 February 1984. 
Whilst there is no shortage of academic works on Thatcher’s foreign policy, her attitude 
to totalitarian states is usually discussed in the context of Great Power politics.
1
 The focus of 
diplomatic historians is almost invariably on her rapport with Mikhail Gorbachev and, latterly, 
on her attempt “to ‘educate’ Deng Xiaoping”.2 By contrast, her involvement with Hungarian 
politics has received at best perfunctory treatment in spite of its wider importance in the British 
strategy of selective opening towards Eastern Europe. In Thatcher’s authorised biography, the 
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first secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, János Kádár, figures cursorily as a 
“conduit for messages” to Moscow.3 Such a dismissive stance is hardly appropriate in view of 
the Thatcher Cabinet’s “‘discovery’ of Eastern Europe, perhaps [for] the first time in British 
history”.4 Although in Whitehall the “official approach” to Soviet satellite states was “one of 
caution and of moderate expectations” throughout the Cold War, it did not necessarily imply 
diplomatic passivity or “disapproving indifference”.5 Geoffrey Howe, unlike his predecessors, 
went to great pains as “the first and only Foreign Secretary to visit all of the Warsaw Treaty 
member states”.6 In the estimation of Hugo Young, this heightened diplomatic activity in the 
East proved to be “one of the more carefully cultivated features of the Thatcher–Howe foreign 
policy”. 7  More than a quarter of a century ago, Brian White ventured to suggest that the 
Conservative governments of the 1980s had been “as concerned with relationships with the 
individual countries of Eastern Europe” as they had “with the Soviet Union”.8 Nevertheless, 
Thatcher’s influence on bilateral relations in the East remains a relatively unexplored area in 
British historiography. 
What follows is the first in-depth examination of her dealings with the Kádár regime, 
based on recently released British and Hungarian archival records, as well as interviews with 
three former British ambassadors to Hungary. The research presented here sheds new light on the 
Thatcher administration’s strategy of promoting systemic reform, rather than revolutionary 
change, in Eastern Europe. It is argued that Anglo-Hungarian relations were hugely influential in 
shaping the prime minister’s pragmatism towards communism, and British foreign policy 
towards Soviet client states. 
 
For a brief period in 1984, Hungary enjoyed an unusually high profile abroad, and not just in 
Britain. Between February and June, the Hungarian capital became the focal point of European 
efforts aimed at reviving stalled international dialogue. “Economically vulnerable to the slightest 
cold draught in East–West relations”, Hungary was dependent on creditor states and trading 
partners and, therefore, had a vested interest in the success of détente.
9
 As a result, the country 
was, momentarily, treated as “a serious interlocutor” even by some major players of “the 
Western big league”.10 By the time the British prime minister descended “on a snow-bound and 
foggy Budapest”, the city had turned from a quiet backwater into a diplomatic hub.11 In the 
words of Malcolm Rifkind, then a parliamentary under-secretary of state at the Foreign Office, 
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Hungary came to play a “leading regional role” in Eastern Europe and benefitted from a 
privileged position in the West.
12
 This was arguably more by accident than design. As Kádár 
freely acknowledged, “We had no such aspirations, but somehow or other we gained a bit of 
prominence as a suitable point of contact between East and West”. He added with pride, “I feel 
the world needs a country like ours”.13 
In reality, Hungary needed the Western world considerably more. In spring 1982, the 
country had been on the brink of insolvency, repeatedly being days or hours away from 
defaulting on its debt payments.
14
 “What the devil can we do but trudge across the fields 
westwards again?” grumbled the weary Hungarian leader to his fellow Politburo members, who 
had gathered to discuss the country’s financial crisis.15 To head off the crisis, from 1979 to 1983 
when “the last Soviet offensive in the Cold War” was being waged, the government in Budapest 
not only maintained good relations but also strengthened its ties with members of the European 
Community.
16
 Despite an “ever-widening circle of sanctions” against Eastern European regimes, 
the unfolding Polish crisis indirectly helped Hungary’s reorientation, raising its profile and 
increasing its appeal internationally.
17
 In comparison with other debt-ridden Warsaw Pact states, 
this “highly improbably Communist” country struck foreign observers as an island of peace and 
prosperity. Although a perceptive British diplomat concluded in 1983 that “the scope for easy 
improvement within the socialist framework” had been slowly but surely “exhausted”, Western 
analysts still esteemed Hungarian economic policies for their innovation.
18
 Contrary to the “more 
jaundiced view” of President Ronald Reagan’s Administration, the verdict of European central 
bankers and government officials was that Hungary’s transformation was “one of the few 
achievements of the West’s long policy of détente” that was worth endorsing.19 As the governor 
of the Bank of England, Gordon Richardson, emphasised to the Committee of Treasury: 
It was important to recognise the value of preserving Hungary’s market-oriented 
economic experiment, and to avoid steps which would tend to drive Hungary, which was 
in a sense a prime example of the working of detente, back into a much greater 
dependence on the Soviet Union.
20
 
The governor’s solicitude belied the fact that Hungary only had limited room for 
manoeuvre. In official communications, the Kádár regime was apt to revert to “colourless 
orthodoxy”; for Western diplomats, foreign policy was “the least rewarding area for discussion 
with Hungarians”. 21  The Hungarian government set out to impress Western negotiators by 
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showing “discretion” and “civility” rather than “independence” and “originality”.22 Nevertheless, 
the leaders of the ruling party were in a bind. For all their subservience to Moscow, the 
Hungarians displayed “a real will” to pursue national objectives without Soviet approval in areas 
where the foreign policy consequences of their economic experiment were “inescapable”.23 The 
British ambassador in Budapest noted in 1980: 
The policies which will most significantly affect Hungary’s relationships with her 
Eastern and Western neighbours over the next decade are being made not in the Foreign 
Ministry but in the Planning Commission, the Finance Ministry and the National Bank.
24
 
Because of Hungary’s financial diplomacy, within a relatively short time between the late 1970s 
and the early 1980s, the country changed from a mere satellite state to a “legitimate negotiating 
partner”.25  Hungary’s credentials as an independent actor were undoubtedly boosted by the 
communist regime’s secret approaches to the European Community.26 For a British diplomat 
privy to the ensuing exchanges, these bold moves resembled “trying to throw out an anchor to 
the West in order to resist a tug to the East”.27 Omitting to consult Yuri Andropov, the Soviet 
leader (1982–1984), the Kádár regime bombarded prominent Western heads of government with 
official invitations. In response, the prime ministers of Britain, Italy, and West Germany jostled 
for positions at the negotiating table with the Hungarians. Kádár, uncharacteristically heedless of 
Moscow’s “advice”, hosted all three without delay, starting with the British prime minister. 
This level of attention from major continental Powers was unprecedented in Hungarian 
history. The British case is particularly striking. Before Thatcher, no serving British prime 
minister had set foot in Budapest. The last time a Hungarian premier had visited London was 
June 1946.
28
 This neglect had both historical and geopolitical roots. In the blunt phrasing of a 
Foreign Office steering brief, Hungary was, and could only ever be, “a secondary power, even 
within Europe”.29 The annual reports of the British Council favoured the description “a country 
of middling importance”.30 Yet, by the 1980s, diplomatic engagement with this obedient minor 
Soviet client state was persistently sought after, by the Americans as well as the Europeans. 
As far as the United States was concerned, the ever-vigilant Kádár never came close to 
defying Moscow. According to one historian, the first secretary’s decision in January 1980 to 
freeze relations with the United States temporarily, against the express wishes of Hungarian 
reformers, foreshadowed his loss of power in 1987–1988.31 In any event, Kádár, a bit player on 
the world stage, more than once categorically refused to receive Reagan or travel to the United 
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States. The stopover in Budapest of the vice-president, George Bush, on 19–20 September 1983, 
which occasioned stiff Soviet rebukes, only further discouraged him from interfering in the 
affairs of the superpowers. “The West is bearing down on us”, declared Kádár tersely, adding a 
stern warning to his domestic critics: 
We can’t let Hungary become a thoroughfare of Western imperialism. Our 
representatives must react cautiously and intelligently . . . . We shouldn’t open all doors 
and gates to the West; nor should we allow so much as a millimetre’s wedge to be driven 
between us and our allies.
32
 
In response to Thatcher’s overtures, however, the Hungarians went out of their way to 
appear accommodating. Sustained objections to the Anglo-Hungarian summit by the Soviet 
foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, were evaded by the sly response that it was too late to cancel 
or rearrange such a high-level meeting in view of diplomatic protocol. Although Kádár initially 
baulked at the prospect of a tête-à-tête with the British prime minister, he did not wish to harm 
his meticulously constructed image as a wise and amicable European elder statesman. 
Eventually, he did not just meet the British guest in private but entered into a relaxed, informal 
discussion free of posturing and rancour, which lasted for two hours. The congenial atmosphere 
of the talks was testimony to both Thatcher’s efforts to impress and Kádár’s single-minded 
pursuit of a new Western sponsor. 
 
The engagement with Hungary had been planned from autumn 1983. In the course of a two-day 
seminar at Chequers with a small group of academics and officials, the Cabinet agreed to focus 
for a while on Eastern Europe, rather than the Soviet Union, in search of “evolutionary gains”. 
As the prime minister’s private secretary for foreign affairs, John Coles, minuted: 
Consideration should be given to the possibility of a visit by the Prime Minister to 
Hungary. High-level contact with Romania had value in helping that country to maintain 
its comparatively independent stance in international affairs. In the case of 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany, visits at above the level of a junior Minister would 
probably be inappropriate.
33
 
Despite the approving reference to Romania’s foreign policy, the sole fixed point in the plan was 
to explore ties with Hungary; the repressive regime of Nicolae Ceauşescu was no longer deemed 
a suitable partner. Thatcher had met Ceauşescu three times – in 1975 (Bucharest), 1978 
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(London), and 1980 (Belgrade) – but when in 1983 she received a letter on his behalf from 
Robert Maxwell, the future proprietor of the Daily Mirror, urging “visits at various levels”, she 
sent an evasive reply.
34
 Similarly, a personal plea made to her by the Romanian dictator “to 
amplify and diversify the relations between Romania and Great Britain” went unheeded.35 
Whereas Bucharest had been ruled out, Warsaw was briefly entertained as a possible 
destination during a review of Thatcher’s travel itinerary. At a chance encounter in St James’s 
Park with her foreign policy advisor, Percy Cradock, the recently appointed head of the Foreign 
Office’s Eastern European Department, John Birch, was sounded out about which country she 
might visit first. “The obvious candidates” that came to mind were Poland or Hungary; but as 
Poland had been under martial law until the summer, Hungary was the better choice, he informed 
Cradock. The upshot of this impromptu exchange, conveyed in a letter from Downing Street a 
few days later, was that she was “minded to visit Hungary”. 36  On 4 November 1983, the 
Hungarian ambassador was urgently summoned to the Foreign Office to hear the “excellent 
news”, by which time the British government was acting so swiftly that the lethargic bureaucracy 
in Budapest was positively startled.
37
 Singled out for British favour, the Hungarians suddenly 
began to stall, not wanting to seem “overly enthusiastic” before the watchful Soviets.38 
In the recollections of Charles Powell, who succeeded Coles as private secretary, there 
were two distinct “strands” to Thatcher’s strategy towards the communist bloc. The first was to 
open communications with “the most approachable” Eastern European countries, starting with 
Hungary; the second was to foster links with “the next generation of Soviet leaders”, such as 
Gorbachev.
39
 It is beyond doubt that the two strands, or stages, were complementary. At the 
outset, though, the long-term benefits of this two-stage strategy were still far from obvious. In 
fact, British officials did their utmost to dampen or refute press speculation about the wider 
importance of Thatcher’s interest in Hungary or any of Moscow’s other satellites. When asked 
about her next step or destination, the prime minister was cryptic. She told the House of 
Commons on 7 February 1984: “Discussions between East and West to improve general 
understanding and to secure more results on disarmament will inevitably take a long time. It is 
clear that we must not relax our vigil in any way”.40 
The “seven-year gap between visits of British Foreign Secretaries and Soviet Foreign 
Ministers” was harshly condemned by contemporaries on the British left, notably the leader of 
the Social Democratic Party, David Owen.
41
 In the same vein, Thatcher’s lack of urgency in 
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finding direct channels of communication with Moscow is interpreted in some secondary sources 
as a sign of hesitancy, or indeed as an early setback, in British policy towards Eastern Europe. 
Due to either American misgivings or a dearth of encouragement from the Kremlin, “the 
evolution of Thatcher’s Soviet policy was reduced to a snail’s pace”.42 Yet a rapid follow-up to 
the negotiations in Hungary was never envisaged. At Chequers, it was decided “to build up 
contacts slowly over the next few years”, but with “no public announcement of this change of 
policy”.43 The historical controversy as to whether the trip to Budapest was a “false start”, an 
isolated “minor triumph”, or a “small opening” obscures the point that the visit was never 
intended as a major improvement in “the climate of East–West relations”. 44  The overtures 
towards Hungary were part of a much wider scheme, which aimed gradually to weaken and 
break up the Eastern bloc, not revive détente.
 
At the seminar in which the new Soviet and Eastern 
European policy was outlined, it was also proposed that “the main means of influencing 
developments” in the Soviet Union should be an increase in radio broadcasts and propaganda.45 
This signalled a return to the information war of the 1950s, rather than to the dialogue of the 
1970s. Clearly, the British government was eager to keep a balance between “elements of 
confrontation and cooperation”.46 
Undoubtedly, Thatcher’s earliest glimpse of life under communism had a profound effect 
on her thinking about how to fight Soviet orthodoxy. The cordial negotiations with a maverick 
regime intrigued and invigorated her but without significantly softening her attitude. Media 
success and public adulation in an enemy state only added to her “sense of mission”.47 They may 
even have inspired her belief that her “firmest allies were the people of the eastern bloc”.48 
Above all, however, her favourable first impressions of Hungary’s market-oriented 
transformation strengthened her pragmatism in dealing with ideologically hostile regimes. 
The political theatre of Thatcher parading as a champion of liberty in the Hungarian 
capital is still remembered by the Tory faithful as a showpiece of British Cold War diplomacy. In 
commemoration of her foray into Eastern European politics, the Margaret Thatcher Foundation 
made available a specially commissioned article in 2015, along with a selection of more than 200 
historical documents, relating to her Budapest visit.
49
 By contrast, in the scholarly literature, 
there is a relative paucity of studies about Thatcher’s foreign policy in Central and Eastern 
Europe.
50
 John Lewis Gaddis, the eminent American historian of the Cold War, named her as 
one of six key “actors” – or “visionaries” – who widened “the range of historical possibility”; the 
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Oxford Sovietologist Archie Brown characterised her as a charismatic, “redefining leader” who 
played a “constructive role in East–West relations”. Nonetheless, many other British academics, 
nursing “a sense of professional grievance against her”, are loath to give her too much credit for 
her conduct of international affairs.
51
 Thatcher’s endeavour to fashion her own brand of 
Ostpolitik is contentious: either summarily dismissed by Western diplomatic historians or 
presented as no more than a modest bid to open channels between Washington and Moscow 
before the October 1986 Reagan–Gorbachev summit in Reykjavík.52 In a fuller assessment, her 
dialogue with the Hungarian government has been depicted as an aborted attempt to broker a 
superpower agreement.
53
 Although it is conceded that during her second term in office, “the 
prime minister was, for a time, able to lay claim to a European leadership role”, her statecraft is 
often scorned in the light of her subsequent dealings with Moscow.
54
 The treatment of her 
historical legacy in East–West relations is typically reduced to a critique of her “indulgence of 
Gorbachev” and her misconceived efforts to stop German unification.55 Arguably, however, in 
1984, Thatcher did not set out to meddle in the affairs of the superpowers by acting as a self-
appointed mediator or Reagan’s messenger to Andropov. Despite being ever mindful of the 
Soviet nuclear threat, she was looking for an independent British policy in Eastern Europe and 
her initial focus was not on Moscow. 
Deferring all futile exchanges with the Kremlin for the foreseeable future, Thatcher 
waited for easier partners than Andropov or Konstantin Chernenko, who succeeded him as 
Soviet leader (1984–1985), for her planned “long haul of patient diplomacy”.56 A telling detail is 
that even after the British “discovery” of Gorbachev, the Hungarian government continued to 
enjoy “priority in Eastern Europe”. 57  In Budapest, a succession of Tory Cabinet ministers 
followed in the prime minister’s footsteps. Ironically, bilateral relations improved during a 
period when British peace activists were being arrested and expelled from Hungary. The irony 
was not lost on Thatcher’s domestic opponents. The founder of European Nuclear Disarmament, 
the left-leaning historian E.P. Thompson, quipped that it was “safer” for the Iron Lady “to go on 
walkabout in . . . Budapest than in Leeds or Liverpool”.58 
Admittedly, by the time of Kádár’s return visit on 31 October 1985, Thatcher had less to 
say to him. The talks in Downing Street were scheduled to last two hours purely to satisfy 
“Hungarian amour propre”.59 Moreover, Kádár, unlike Ceauşescu seven years before, was not 
invited to an audience with the Queen, as “the sight of him being received in Buckingham 
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Palace” was held to be too “controversial”. 60  It appears that once direct links had been 
established with the Kremlin, the Hungarian leader was no longer sought after as an 
intermediary. Still, as Powell reminded the prime minister, “The fact of the visit is the story, 
more than what is said”.61 In addition, the Anglo-Hungarian negotiations provided an excellent 
opportunity to re-evaluate “the political and economic strains between the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe and to probe Kádár on Gorbachev”.62 In November 1985, on the eve of the 
Gorbachev–Reagan summit in Geneva, Thatcher wrote to Kádár: “I should like to remain in 
close touch with you as events unfold”.63 
In spite of the improvements in Anglo-Soviet relations, Hungary featured prominently in 
British plans for Eastern Europe in the second half of the 1980s. Whilst the peaceful heroism of 
the Polish Solidarity movement appealed to Tory sentiment a great deal more than Hungarian 
tinkering with state socialism, the transitional regime in Budapest was given British backing as a 
political imperative, even in the final months of its existence. As Robert Cooper, head of the 
policy planning staff at the Foreign Office, reassured his Hungarian partners in October 1989 
before the first post-communist general election in the spring: 
Great Britain does not regard Eastern Europe as a closed bloc of states . . . . After the 
election, in which [Imre] Pozsgay, [Miklós] Németh and [Gyula] Horn are the West’s 
preferred candidates, the new Hungarian administration can expect a similar level of 
assistance to the Solidarity government. Countries with central planning have never yet 
turned into market economies, and the Foreign Office is searching high and low for a 
positive example. For a variety of reasons, Hungary seems better suited to this role than 
Poland.
64
 
Although the degree of British endorsement of the “preferred candidates” may have been 
overstated in the Hungarian records, Hungary’s perceived competitive advantage over Poland 
may not have been quite so overblown.
65
 During his visit to Budapest in June 1988, David 
Mellor, a minister of state responsible for Eastern European affairs, still described Hungary as 
Britain’s “most important partner” in the region after the Soviet Union.66 There is no doubt that 
British officials supported Hungary’s liberalisation and democratisation, but within the existing 
political framework. Howe reappraised Hungary as “a model for Eastern Europe” at a time when 
oppressive neo-Stalinist regimes prevailed regionally. As late as 1987–1988, he was adamant 
that Britain had a “vested interest in the success of Hungarian reform”.67 Despite her scepticism 
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about the malleability of communism, the prime minister echoed Howe’s opinions. Occasionally, 
she went a step further. For instance, she revealed to Kádár that she considered the continued 
division of Europe until the next millennium to be an absolute certainty as well as a necessity.
68
 
In 2013, a former Hungarian foreign minister, the diplomatic historian Géza Jeszenszky, 
eulogised Thatcher “for what she had done for the liberation of Hungary and of the whole area of 
Central Europe”.69 The extent to which the “Iron Lady” can be seen as an agent of change in 
Eastern Europe is a moot point. It could be argued that the most remarkable attributes of her 
involvement with Hungarian affairs were her flexibility and willingness to pursue a moderate 
strategy, which do not fit at all with her image as an uncompromising conviction politician. As 
her official biographer explains, “Gradually, the idea grew in her mind that not all Communists 
were necessarily alike”.70 Ultimately, she was ready to back a semi-authoritarian regime that was 
bankrupt, morally and literally, and to help sustain it in the face of growing democratic 
opposition. Her concern for Western European security and prosperity overshadowed her “moral 
outrage” that was, in the eyes of her Conservative supporters, “the mainspring” of her opposition 
to communism and an essential part of her political make-up.
71
 
 
The opening towards Hungary was intrinsic to the British strategy of encouraging “creative 
ferment in Eastern Europe” and “gradual evolution, not revolution, away from the Soviet 
pattern”.72 With more sober calculation than “missionary zeal”, the Conservative government set 
out to inspire “a quiet, long term challenge to the dominance of the Communist Party” in 
Warsaw Pact countries.
73
 In the absence of powerful opposition forces, with the notable 
exception of Solidarity in Poland, this peaceful change was expected to come from within the 
ruling elites, principally from the bloated state and party apparatus. One of the main aims of this 
carefully calibrated policy was to induce Eastern European leaders “to think and act for 
themselves” without provoking Soviet repression, political chaos, and revolutionary turbulence 
in the region.
74
 
This was a far cry from Tory rhetoric about fighting “the murderous nonsense of 
Communism”.75 In his recent memoirs, the Thatcherite stalwart William Waldegrave declared 
vauntingly, “Alone in Britain, the Conservatives were wholly sound in their opposition to the 
desperately dangerous late Soviet Empire”.76 He credited Thatcher with a major contribution to 
the diplomatic endgame of the Cold War between 1988 and 1990. In his triumphalist words, “It 
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was a glorious time”, when “Britain played a leading and honourable part in titanic events”.77 He 
reminisced especially fondly about his days as a minister of state at the Foreign Office: 
“Wherever one went as a Minister of Mrs Thatcher’s Government, recognised as 
uncompromising about freedom, but nonetheless influential with Gorbachev as well as the 
Americans, one was welcomed by the heroes who won back the freedom of central Europe”.78 
Revelling in his recollections of having tea with the Solidarity leader, Lech Wałęsa, or being 
consulted by the Czechoslovak president, Václav Havel, about the choice of new uniforms for 
the presidential guards in Prague Castle, Waldegrave painted erstwhile dissidents, such as the 
Czech premier, Václav Klaus, as “more Thatcherite than Thatcher”.79 Yet this anti-communist 
hero worship scarcely does justice to British involvement in Eastern Europe during the final 
decade of the Cold War. 
The case of Hungary perfectly illustrates the point that British prestige in post-communist 
countries did not necessarily stem from promoting or rewarding dissent. Characteristically, 
Waldegrave lauded Miklós Németh, the last prime minister of socialist Hungary, as a friend, “in 
his modest way one of the key heroes”.80 According to a memorandum written in 1990 by Birch 
in his capacity as British ambassador to Hungary (1989–1995), Thatcher also “seemed to have 
taken something of a shine to Németh”.81 More to the point, she positively welcomed the fact 
that systemic change in Budapest was driven by communist reformers and not by people on the 
street. She urged the democratic opposition “to behave responsibly”, warning them against any 
“auction of promises”.82 
The astonishing transformation of “the militantly anti-Socialist Thatcher, Britain’s 
Conservative prime minister, into the strongest supporter” of Gorbachev, has been convincingly 
documented by Archie Brown.
83
 Arguably, however, the Soviet leader was neither the first 
“system moderniser” targeted by Britain nor the first prominent communist with whom Thatcher 
managed “to do business”. 84  The British government had already adopted a comparatively 
friendly stance in dealing with senior Hungarian party officials long before the “change to 
engagement” in Britain’s Cold War policy. 85  By autumn 1990, Thatcher still struggled to 
comprehend why and how the communists had lost power in Hungary during the spring. 
Although she lent her full support to the right-wing government of József Antall, she found the 
new premier “dry and lengthy” in comparison with his socialist predecessor.86 Whilst she “nailed 
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the Tory colours firmly to the [Hungarian] Democratic Forum mast”, she could hardly pretend 
that she had been working for this outcome all along.
87
 
In spite of “her intellectual curiosity” that “led her in some unforeseen directions”, 
Thatcher’s foreign policy towards Eastern Europe followed traditional lines.88 Her realism in 
opting for a “‘twin-track’ policy of military strength coupled with the pursuit of accommodation” 
was based on the received wisdom at the Foreign Office.
89
 Her readiness to advance British 
business interests was not a personal impulse either. It has been claimed that “a different 
individual faced with the same situations that confronted Thatcher would have made different 
choices”, but the extent to which her personality shaped British foreign policy towards Warsaw 
Pact states is open to question.
90
 Whitehall’s priority from the mid-1980s was to secure an 
orderly transition, one way or another, without upsetting the status quo. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that historians have been “struck by the elements of consistency in the British 
approach to East–West relations from the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s”.91 Albeit British 
activity intensified between 1983 and 1990, the limited objectives stayed the same. For all her 
“pragmatic opportunism”, the prime minister remained committed to a smooth adjustment and a 
slow evolution, discouraging radicalism and on occasion even wishing to stop the clock.
92
 As 
late as March 1989, in a discussion with Gorbachev, she cited Hungary as “a showcase of 
socialist transformation”, scrupulously avoiding any mention of the loaded term 
“democratisation”. She went so far as to describe the Hungarian political reforms as a local 
variant of “perestroika”, in a bid to make them more palatable to the Soviets.93 
By the time the communist regimes started to collapse in Central Europe, the 
contradictions in the style and substance of Thatcher’s diplomacy were exposed. Nevertheless, 
the gradualist strategy she had been so actively pursuing was not at odds with guidelines issued 
by the Foreign Office. From 1985, officials there were advocating “maximum engagement”, and 
not only with Hungary and Poland, but with the whole region. Birch, then heading the new 
Eastern European Department, argued for a steady rise in British influence through a policy of 
“stealth”. He candidly stated that this involved cultivating uncomfortably close relations with 
various regimes of ill repute at the substantial price of legitimising them in the short run, as he 
resolved the troubling moral dilemma: “We cannot condemn ordinary people in Eastern Europe 
to isolation from the West simply because they have nasty rulers”.94 
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Thinking along similar lines, Thatcher embarked on her Eastern European diplomacy in 1984 by 
calling on Kádár, a dyed-in-the-wool communist, burdened with memories of “murder and 
treachery”. The former dictator, who reportedly “rambled a great deal and smoked at a rate of six 
cigarettes an hour”, had been “an international leper” in the aftermath of the 1956 Hungarian 
revolution.
95
 He suffered from a guilt complex to the end of his long career. For British 
observers, deep-seated reservations about the chequered past of an ageing satrap of the Soviet 
empire were, however, more than offset by his perceived “ability to handle the Russians”, his 
reputedly “unshakeable grasp of reality”, and his unique track record of giving “communism in 
[a] small country something close to an acceptable face”. Notwithstanding its obvious 
limitations, the Hungarian brand of “pragmatic national communism” was judged to be a viable, 
comparatively benign alternative to the neo-Stalinist model prevailing in the Eastern bloc.
96
 
Accordingly, Thatcher’s initial meeting with the first secretary of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party was not merely an attempt to open secret channels of communication with the 
Soviets, as British journalists widely assumed at the time. More than ready to tap into the canny 
old Bolshevik’s intimate knowledge of the Kremlin’s ways, the prime minister nonetheless 
refrained from treating the “undisputed master of Hungary” as a diplomatic courier. 97  She 
entered into negotiations expressly “to give the Hungarians discreet encouragement, both in their 
economic reforms and in developing their contacts with the West”. 98  The thinly disguised 
subversive motive behind this approach was to promote diversity and nonconformity within the 
Warsaw Pact by loosening Hungary’s economic ties with Moscow. The Hungarians clearly 
anticipated the destabilising impact of Thatcher’s diplomacy in the short term, but viewed the 
threat as “negligible”.99 The potential risks for Hungary were massively outweighed by the likely 
benefits of an unprecedented level of British interest in the country’s affairs. 
By contrast, for Britain there were few incentives to be had in courting a poor member-
state of a hostile military alliance. The exploratory talks offered no real easing of international 
tensions in the midst of the Soviet–American confrontation over nuclear missiles. Yet the prime 
minister’s lively political discourse with Kádár had some immediate effect, not least on 
neighbouring states. Whereas the reactions from Poland and East Germany were not 
unfavourable, the strongly worded protests from Czechoslovakia showed that the policy of 
diversification and differentiation was already serving to weaken solidarity amongst the Soviet 
client states. Two dailies of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Rudé Právo and Pravda, 
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published belligerent editorials questioning the importance and usefulness of the Thatcher–Kádár 
summit. These, in turn, provoked bad-tempered exchanges between the foreign ministries in 
Budapest and Prague.
100
 
The Anglo-Hungarian rapprochement signalled a new, active phase in British Ostpolitik, 
characterised by an increased diplomatic presence, a distinction between inveterate enemies and 
lesser foes, a search for investment opportunities, and an explicit use of financial resources for 
political ends. By the mid-1980s, Britain began to regain some long-lost economic, cultural, and 
political leverage in Eastern Europe, facing down French competition and, belatedly, responding 
to the growth of West German influence. Concerns about German industrial advantage and 
political muscle in Central Europe added a particular impetus to the competitive urges of British 
foreign policy. In recognition, Kádár played on Thatcher’s fears and anti-German sentiments 
with consummate skill, hoping to capitalise on the Western European race for emerging markets. 
He went out of his way to convince his English guest of the complete “openness” of the 
Hungarian economy, whilst pointedly remarking that he did not wish the country’s foreign trade 
to be “monopolised by . . . the Federal Republic of Germany”.101 
There was a degree of wishful thinking in all of this. The British government had neither 
the requisite resources nor the resolve to counterbalance the ongoing expansion of West 
Germany’s trade, still less to take the economic lead in this part of the world. Britain and 
Hungary were equally anxious to expand trade, but “they both wished to sell”.102 Nevertheless, 
the Tory prime minister “put down a marker” in economic, as well as political and cultural, 
relations with Hungary. As Peter Unwin, the British ambassador in Budapest (1983–1986), 
summed up: 
The visit was a successful exercise in positive discrimination at the highest level. We 
must put time, effort and money into the follow-up. For historical, geographical and 
political reasons, we have tended to be on the outside track among major Western 
countries here. The visit has given us a chance to get nearer to the inside track.
103
 
The fact that Thatcher was hosted in Budapest ahead of Helmut Kohl, the West German 
chancellor, and Bettino Craxi, the Italian premier, and eight months before Kádár journeyed to 
Paris to see the French president, François Mitterrand, was suggestive of Britain’s growing 
appeal in Eastern Europe as a leading European Power and a key ally of the United States. The 
64-hour visit, including more than five hours of intensive talks, left a profound impression on 
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Hungarian government officials, political dissidents, and the public alike. Paradoxically, the 
Hungarian administration and its opponents each regarded the presence of the British prime 
minister in Budapest as beneficial to their respective causes. 
At the “Britain Salutes Hungary” reception in the Barbican, London, on 25 April 1989, 
Thatcher reflected on her visit to the Hungarian capital five years earlier: 
There are several reasons why I want to support Hungary very much and to come here 
this evening to demonstrate it . . . . When I went there and had a fascinating visit in 1984, 
I did not know what to expect. First I found a Parliament building which was then not 
exactly used for a Parliament but I hope it will be . . . . Second, when I went around, as I 
usually do, among the people I went into a massive market, a real market where people 
brought all of their things to exchange and I thought immediately there are people here 
who know what the market is . . . . I thought there is the basis here of a market economy. 
I was practically mobbed and I must tell you, everyone knew my name. I was so sorry 
they did not all have a vote.
104
 
Whether the prime minister ventured into Eastern Europe “partly because she enjoyed preaching 
the superior virtues of capitalism and being received by ordinary people either as a liberator or 
sage”, she certainly caused a sensation in Budapest.105 Meanwhile, in the Western world, Britain 
appeared in a favourable light, both as a protagonist of non-confrontation and as an “autonomous 
international actor”.106 An editorial in The Times, “True Blue on the Danube”, acknowledged that 
Hungary was “the natural choice” for starting a “sensible dialogue” with Eastern bloc states, 
whilst warning the reader that the country’s “seemingly independent policies at home and abroad 
could cease tomorrow at a frown from the Kremlin”.107 
On her return to Britain, Thatcher penned “a personal word” to Reagan to explain why 
she “thought it right to take the first, small step of a visit to Hungary”.108 She was not seeking 
approval as such, but she clearly sought to reassure the president: 
I made it plain to all . . . that I stood for Western values of freedom, justice and political 
democracy and would defend and advocate them anywhere. By emphasising Britain’s 
loyalty to and solidarity with NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] I signalled 
that the usual Soviet bloc attempts at wedge-driving would not work. My main message 
was that, although I could speak for no-one except Britain, the West in general and you 
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personally were absolutely sincere in their desire to achieve arms reductions and security 
at a lower level of weaponry.
109
 
The real purpose of writing to the president was, however, to convey her immediate sense of “the 
ingenuity and determination” with which the Hungarians were pursuing their economic reforms 
and dispel any lingering illusions that might be harboured by the United States Administration 
about inducing sweeping political changes behind the Iron Curtain in the short or medium term. 
As she stressed to Reagan, “We are in the business of coexistence with the East for as far ahead 
as I feel able to look; and this will mean dialogue on a broader front than arms control alone”.110 
Thereby, indirectly, Thatcher also served notice of her government’s readiness to approach 
Moscow in the future and forge closer links with Eastern Europe. Harking back to the early days 
of the Cold War, she was plainly keen to defy the realities of a bipolar world by playing an active 
and constructive diplomatic role in pursuit of shared NATO objectives and specific British aims. 
 
The Kádár regime, an outwardly obedient but unconventional client of Moscow, was a perfect 
soft target for British diplomacy in Eastern Europe. In 1982, the country had been earmarked by 
the Foreign Office “for positive discrimination” and “special treatment on account of her 
relatively free liberal economic and social policies”.111 Bryan Cartledge, the British ambassador 
in Budapest (1980–1983), pointed out that Britain had “both a political and a commercial stake 
in the success of Hungary’s economic reform”.112 Unwin, his successor, was less sanguine about 
the Kádár regime’s domestic “achievements”, concluding that Hungary was not “a particularly 
durable or stable place”, its social consensus being built on “gross hypocrisy”. Still, he was 
confident that the policy of making Hungary “a more organic place, proud of its national identity 
and resistant to anything which absorbed it into a communist monolith” was bearing fruit. He 
reported to the foreign secretary: 
I believe that the policy is paying off. The West, and Britain in particular, has an 
influence in Hungary unimaginable in the old days. How can we take this process 
further? Your recent despatch on British policy towards Eastern Europe provides 
valuable guidelines. You describe our objectives in this part of the world as being to 
weaken Soviet control over its satellites by supporting a policy of evolutionary change. 
This is what we are doing in Hungary; and already there are faint, pale signs of a revival 
of indigenous political life.
113
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Before leaving Hungary in 1986, Unwin gained the impression that Kádár’s unfinished 
“masterpiece” – his work in constructing “a tentative sort of national unity” and “communism 
with a reasonably human face” – might not outlive its creator.114 In one of his later despatches, 
the ambassador hazarded the prediction that the demise of communism in Hungary might not be 
too far away.
115
 His superiors did not share his optimism. Nevertheless, it was generally accepted 
in Whitehall that the moderate success of “creeping capitalism” in Hungary yielded a distinctive 
transitional pattern.
116
 The combination of the slow pace and careful nature of the Hungarian 
reforms was in line with British priorities as it minimised the risk of a violent backlash. 
The hybrid political and economic system of Hungary, dubbed “elastic socialism” by 
cynical communist officials, was a world apart from Thatcherite ideals.
117
 Having no “major 
organised movement of dissent”, the country was only at the “half-way stage” in reaching even 
Yugoslav levels of “democracy”.118 Authoritarian traits were not much in evidence, but the 
system was correctly identified by British analysts as one of “repressive tolerance” rather than 
liberalism.
119
 It is little wonder that the prime minister was initially reluctant to set foot on 
Hungarian soil despite the repeated urging of her advisors.
120
 When Cartledge, as her former 
private secretary for foreign affairs, had expressed a preference for a diplomatic posting to 
Hungary, Thatcher retorted, “Hungary? How boring!” 121  Unsurprisingly, the new British 
ambassador found it difficult for a while to stir the prime minister’s interest in anything 
Hungarian. Matters were not helped by the looming visit to London of the charmless hard-line 
foreign minister, Frigyes Puja, an event that threatened to put her off ever going to Budapest.
122
 
As it transpired, the meeting with Puja in 1982 was cancelled at the very last minute because of 
the sudden disappearance of the prime minister’s son, Mark, in Africa. To add insult to injury, 
the Hungarian guest became stuck for 40 minutes in a broken-down lift at the “Ambassador’s 
Entrance” of the Foreign Office.123 
The following year, an entirely different Hungarian visitor called at Number 10: the 
“inimitable” deputy prime minister, József Marjai, who successfully piqued the Conservative 
leader’s curiosity about Hungary’s “socialist market economy”.124 The head-to-head with the 
“sophisticated” and “forthcoming” ex-diplomat had been contrived by Cartledge with the 
undisguised aim of overcoming Thatcher’s disinterest in Hungary. 125  The deputy prime 
minister’s idiosyncratic style and conversation went a long way towards convincing her that a 
trip to Budapest could be “an unexpectedly interesting and stimulating experience”.126 Marjai 
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took great care to massage Thatcher’s ego, harping on her immense popularity in Hungary. More 
importantly, he cleverly tailored his observations on Hungarian management practices to his 
devoutly Tory audience: 
The Government did not wish to manage and organise the economy. The intention was to 
work through economic means. The Prime Minister asked whether this was a reference to 
economic incentives. Mr. Marjai said that it was. Profit must be the incentive. It was not 
for the Government to hand out money. The Government did not have money. The Prime 
Minister commented that these remarks could have been made in one of her own 
speeches.
127
 
Marjai did not shy away from indulging her intellectual inquisitiveness or her “self-regard”.128 In 
later years, Kádár employed a similar tack, applauding her forthrightness and showering her with 
compliments.
129
 Rezső Bányász, the Hungarian ambassador in London (1981–1984), relayed to 
the British government Kádár’s fulsome praise of Thatcher after his first meeting with her: 
Kádár, used to conventional exchanges with foreign leaders, had been “disarmed” by the 
Prime Minister’s manner and had commented on the high quality and range of their talks. 
He had remarked that the Prime Minister was a sincere person who had not sought to 
bully him with her ideas. Elsewhere she had made an enormous impression by her vitality 
and informality. That type of politician was unknown in Eastern Europe.
130
 
Whether or not she was susceptible to such blatant flattery, Thatcher was fascinated by 
her two encounters with Kádár. During his visit to London, she claimed that he “had done 
wonders with Hungary”, adding for good measure: “We shall be interested to see to what extent 
your pioneering course is treated as a model by others”.131 In 1988, when the Hungarian leader 
was stabbed in the back by “Brutuses” after 32 years in power,132 Kádár received a personal 
letter from Thatcher in which she wrote: 
As you lay down the day-to-day burden of office, I would not like this moment to pass 
without paying a personal tribute to your achievements. I recall with particular pleasure 
my visit to Hungary and your visit to here and the conversations which we had. I believe 
they played an important part in the current improvement in East/West relations.
133
 
Her warm tribute to a one-time dictator, which was evidently not cleared with the Foreign 
Office, went far beyond what was required by protocol. Kádár, in response, waxed lyrical about 
the “deep and lasting impressions” he held of their two meetings.134 
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Personal niceties aside, by the mid-1980s, the prime minister was quietly endorsing the 
Hungarian example of systemic modernisation in state socialism. Her endorsement so alarmed 
the Soviets that a senior analyst in Moscow branded Hungary’s economic policies as “socialist 
Thatcherism”.135 Whilst this label grossly exaggerated the Iron Lady’s influence, the hybrid 
Hungarian model did appeal to a cross-section of British politicians irrespective of their stance 
on socialism or Thatcherism. Having visited Budapest in 1986, Labour’s shadow foreign 
secretary, Denis Healey, thought, “in Hungary the freedom of expression was total” 
notwithstanding the curtailment of other political liberties.
136
 Subjected to character assassination 
by the Stalinist regime in 1950, Healey came to voice his admiration for Hungary by the 
1980s.
137
 The country’s relations with Austria were becoming “so close”, he mused, “that one 
felt the Empress Maria Theresa was once more on her throne”. 138  Breaking with partisan 
tradition, the shadow foreign secretary was not afraid to acknowledge Tory efforts in Eastern 
Europe. He admitted to Mátyás Domokos, the Hungarian ambassador in London (1984–1989), 
that in all likelihood his party would not have developed such friendly ties with any communist 
country.
139
 This point was not lost on the Hungarians, who consistently preferred to deal with 
Thatcher and the Conservatives. They found the prime minister “brilliant”, if ideologically 
offensive.
140
 Accordingly, the Foreign Ministry in Budapest paid little heed to Neil Kinnock’s 
assertion that under his leadership a Labour government would have further improved relations 
with Hungary.
141
 The Kádár regime cultivated fraternal links with Labour but, in Domokos’s 
words, relations between the two socialist parties were kept “deliberately rather 
undemonstrative”.142 
At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the Tory MP Robert Adley commended 
Hungary for another reason entirely. In his capacity as chair of the British–Hungarian 
Parliamentary Group, he put it to Thatcher that “in many ways Hungary was less ‘socialist’ than 
Britain”.143 An ardent defender of this “fiercely proud nation”, he had been urging the prime 
minister to take up the Hungarian invitation to visit Budapest since 1981.
144
 In strict confidence, 
he had also passed on her encouraging written response to Bányász, the then Hungarian 
ambassador.
145
 Meanwhile, Lord Shackleton, the chairman of the East European Trade Council, 
extolled Hungary for going “as far as practicable in ameliorating the worst aspects of a 
communist regime”, repeating to Thatcher the words of a former deputy prime minister of 
Hungary: “we are, of course, not Marxists, but Keynesian[s]”.146 A throwaway remark perhaps 
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only recorded for posterity in London because of its mild amusement value, any such instance of 
individuality and candour added to Hungary’s nonconformist credentials. As the departing 
British ambassador encapsulated in his valedictory despatch on 20 May 1983, Hungary had 
become “a distinctly different communist country”, which had “made reasonably good progress” 
without crossing the “socialist Rubicon”. He observed presciently: “But the deep aspiration of 
most Hungarians to see, or for their grandchildren to see, their country achieve a situation similar 
to that of Austria is legitimate and not necessarily fanciful”. 147  Heartened by optimistic 
assessments of this kind, Thatcher, “a hero of dissidents from the Baltic states to Romania”, 
found no difficulty in backing a communist experiment.
148
 She “got on like a house on fire” with 
senior Hungarian officials such as Marjai long before she built a rapport with Gorbachev.
149
 
It is suggested here that preserving a relatively stable, moderately versatile, outwardly 
prosperous Hungary was central to British planning for a gradual, peaceful transformation of 
Eastern Europe. In Hungary, unlike in Poland, the Iron Lady helped to reinforce a socialist 
regime, extending credit facilities and political favours throughout the 1980s. Her support for 
Hungary did not diminish her preoccupation with the idea of “beating the Soviets on the 
battlefield of ideas”, but it clearly demonstrated her capacity for pragmatism in the conduct of 
foreign affairs.
150
 In one critic’s judgement, Thatcher was frequently “more pragmatic in foreign 
affairs than she let on” and “generally fared better when she adopted that approach”.151 For all 
her legendary hostility to the left, she had no qualms about promoting a social democratic route 
for political transition in as much as it promised an orderly path to democracy. As Brown 
documented, her decision “to engage more actively with Communist leaders” was not 
irreconcilable with her radical right-wing predilections: 
Even before Gorbachev came on the scene, Thatcher was already seriously interested in 
replacing Communism in Eastern Europe with democracy, though she hardly expected 
events to move as fast as they did. Her political instincts did not readily lead her to 
contemplate the possibility that transformative change could be initiated from within the 
upper echelons of the Communist Party apparatus. However, it is commendable that, 
rather than rely just on those political instincts, she devoted as much time as she did to 
reassessing developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and consulting 
specialists outside as well as inside government.
152
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The extent to which British diplomatic overtures towards Eastern Europe followed the 
recommendations of academic experts, the advice of civil servants, or Thatcher’s own political 
instincts is unclear. As one “occasional advisor”, George Urban, bemoaned, there is barely any 
mention in her memoirs of “the extramural assistance she often invited from and was liberally 
given by academic supporters”. 153  The Hungarian-born journalist had good reason to feel 
affronted; along with the historians Hugh Seton-Watson and Dominic Lieven, he had undertaken 
“‘small’ assignments” to prepare the prime minister for her first visit to Eastern Europe.154 Yet 
there can be no doubt that the decision to “single out Hungary for special treatment” was 
ultimately inspired not by sympathetic scholars, Conservative think tanks, or crusading 
journalists of the right, but by a steady stream of favourable diplomatic reports from Budapest.
155
 
Successive ambassadors hammered home the tangible political benefits and economic 
advantages that Hungary boasted in comparison with its “less provident East European 
neighbours”.156 In response, the Tory government helped to buttress Hungary’s financial position 
in the country’s hour of need and was instrumental in Hungary becoming the first Eastern bloc 
member of the International Monetary Fund in May 1982 and the World Bank two months later. 
To avoid the “apocalypse”, a short-term international credit facility of US$100 million, partly 
guaranteed by the Bank of England, was offered to Hungary in spring 1982.
157
 For a brief while, 
a British government guarantee was even considered. One way or another, one-fifth of the whole 
sum was secured by the British taxpayer. This level of commitment to an enemy state was 
without precedent; it also represented a break with British banking tradition. 
The prioritisation of Kádár’s regime in the early 1980s was out of all proportion to the 
country’s size, strength, or strategic importance. The last major British involvement with 
Hungarian finances was in the 1920s as part of a League of Nations reconstruction plan. Britain’s 
interest in Hungary has often coincided with wars and economic instability. It is no accident that 
Thatcher’s diplomatic initiative was conceived in the midst of the Euromissile crisis. It was a 
perilous moment, when Gorbachev was still “only a speck on the Horizon”.158 
 
During a lively debate at the House of Lords in April 1985, a former British ambassador to 
Hungary, Lord Moran, issued an impassioned plea to the government not to “get too cosy” with 
communist regimes. Alarmed by seeing “unreasonable euphoria” about Gorbachev, he cautioned 
against further official British engagement with Eastern Europe, fearing that it might “discourage 
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the courageous dissidents”.159 With regard to Hungary, Lord Moran’s was a rather exaggerated 
anxiety, as the Thatcher visit did not dishearten dissidents; it merely emboldened them. 
Consequently, the Tory leader entered into Hungarian political folklore as one of the country’s 
“liberators”. To those who presided over the dismantling of the one-party state, she became 
“something of a celebrity, perhaps even a heroine”.160 Several of the accidental heroes of 1989, 
notably the prime minister and the foreign minister of the first post-communist administration, 
expressed deep admiration for Thatcher.
161
 All the same, in the aftermath of her visit to Budapest 
in 1984, the British government’s relations with the Hungarian communist regime did become 
implausibly amicable, whilst stopping short of being “cosy”. 
When Thatcher returned to Budapest in 1990, she found an entirely different political 
landscape. She had to admit that her policy on Eastern Europe had been “optimistic but not 
nearly optimistic enough!” She toasted the newly elected prime minister of the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum by listing the achievements of his socialist forebears: 
Hungary has been in the front rank of the changes which have taken place. You started on 
economic reform well ahead of others in Central and Eastern Europe. It was Hungary’s 
decision to open its borders to allow East Germans to go freely to the West which started 
the train of events leading to the demolition of the Berlin Wall and with the GDR [East 
Germany], you held the first fully democratic elections in Central and Eastern Europe for 
over forty years and elected a Conservative Prime Minister. Once again, Hungary showed 
the right way!
162
 
Inevitably, Thatcher was not averse to claiming some of the credit for this Conservative turn in 
Hungary: 
Britain had a hand in these changes too. In the dark days of the Cold War, we took the 
decision to encourage and sustain the East European countries which wanted change and 
it was naturally to Hungary that we turned first with my visit in 1984 . . . . We also 
understood the need to move cautiously and not say things publicly which would only be 
counter-productive and raise suspicions about the dialogue we were seeking, but we 
thought that if Britain and Hungary could forge a new climate between them, then it 
would be a model for others and would help them enlarge their freedom and their 
independence.
163
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In this supposed attempt to “forge a new climate”, each side arguably exhibited plenty of 
pragmatism. Agreeing to disagree on most substantive things at the outset, they nevertheless 
maintained a cordial dialogue, apparently sweeping under the carpet their ideological 
differences, not to mention their disputes in the field of international relations and global 
security. Of course, much of this was a façade. Thatcher’s charm offensive in Hungary was 
attended by an anti-communist propaganda campaign, whilst the Kádár regime’s friendly 
opening to Britain was offset by intensified espionage activity in London, heightened 
surveillance of the British Embassy in Budapest, and a clampdown on the Anglophile opposition 
in Hungary. Yet these contradictions were less visible or disturbing in the British case, as the 
loathing of totalitarian regimes and the personal commitment to fighting communism on the part 
of the fabled “Iron Lady” could never be called into question. On balance, the British 
contribution to averting economic disaster in Hungary in 1982, and the subsequent diplomatic 
overtures, only increased the longevity and “elasticity” of the beleaguered Kádár regime, which 
muddled through the 1980s with growing reliance on Western, including British, financial 
assistance. 
Thatcher’s triumphant visit was, in itself, a sign of far-reaching changes in the political 
environment during the latter phases of the Cold War. Her two meetings with Kádár in 1984 and 
1985 signalled a shift in British policy, not just in bilateral relations with Hungary, but in the 
wider regional and European context. Plainly, one of Thatcher’s aims was to explore indirect 
channels of communication with the Kremlin. At the same time, the Tory government was 
acutely aware of the diplomatic initiatives of Western European economic rivals, in particular 
West Germany’s Ostpolitik. That said, Thatcher’s interest in the Kádár regime, at least until 
Gorbachev commanded her attention, was prompted as much by Hungarian as by international 
developments. The process of “creative ferment” planned for Eastern Europe by the Foreign 
Office was already at work in Hungary, as evidenced by ongoing economic liberalisation, the 
regeneration of civil society, and, most gratifyingly, by a rise in British prestige and cultural 
influence.
164
 Indeed, the subversive impact and “soft power” of Britain were brought to the 
notice of the communist security services, partly explaining their dogged determination to 
confine the British Council’s activities in Budapest to the closely monitored Embassy building, a 
restrictive measure adopted until the very end of the Cold War. This was a striking anomaly in 
view of the privileged treatment of the Kádár regime in London. 
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Thatcher’s Eastern European diplomacy and its legacy are by no means the most 
controversial aspects of her premiership. Even so, some critics have derided the hostile stance 
she took on German unification and the perceived way in which she “liked to present herself as a 
latter-day Churchill, brokering high-level conversations between Washington and Moscow”.165 
In any event, she is generally credited with at least a modest enhancement of Britain’s influence 
in global affairs. Whether she was a “liberator” of countries such as Hungary is, however, a 
different matter altogether. The Conservative government by the second half of the 1980s, 
although consistently backing the steady process of democratisation, refrained from urging any 
dramatic acceleration of the political changes in either Hungary or Poland, fearing a backlash 
from Moscow. Undoubtedly, this cautious approach was shared by Britain’s European allies and, 
to a lesser extent, by the Americans.
166
 Still, Thatcher’s pragmatism in foreign policy was in 
stark contrast with the uncompromising persona she projected. Both British and Hungarian 
documents bear out the huge disparity between her public image and the substance of British 
diplomacy. It has been argued here that there was a yawning gap between rhetoric and reality 
when it came to Anglo-Hungarian relations. For all Thatcher’s core beliefs and ideological 
posturing, her successive governments were ready to engage with Kádár’s Hungary, so 
conferring a level of credibility on his communist regime – not an entirely comfortable outcome 
from a British perspective. “Inevitable ambiguities” of this kind were inherent in Britain’s whole 
strategy towards Eastern Europe; they were almost certainly magnified because of Thatcher’s 
involvement.
167
 
 
As unlikely as it was, the dedicated search for an acceptable “socialist” alternative to the rigid 
Soviet model was partly sponsored by a Tory prime minister famed for her visceral “hatred of 
socialism” and her “unflinching willingness to express that hatred in the clearest imaginable 
terms”.168 Gorbachev’s advisor Anatoly Chernyaev suspected that she cultivated unorthodox 
communist leaders in the hope that they would “bring about ‘the self-liquidation’ of a political 
and social order that was alien to human nature”.169  Yet Thatcher’s foreign policy towards 
Hungary belied her “stark, black-and-white worldviews”, evincing flexibility and complexity.170 
Considering that her attitude to the East is portrayed in the historiography as “essentially wary 
and sceptical”, she was in fact remarkably open to advice from experts and persuasion by 
diplomats on the ground. Unafraid to make “a political spectacle out of a trend of official 
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thinking”, she also allowed herself to be affected by strong personal impressions. 171  The 
manifestations of sympathy and gratitude with which she was fêted by Hungarian communist 
dignitaries arguably appealed to her vanity no less than the enthusiasm of the crowds whom she 
remembered meeting at the Great Market Hall in Budapest.
172
 
More importantly, the visit to Hungary convinced her of the wisdom of the gradualist 
strategy advocated by the Foreign Office. As late as March 1989, she told the Hungarian foreign 
minister, Péter Várkonyi, in London that she regarded Hungary as “a good case” of what was 
possible by way of “socialist renewal” and indicated that it was having a salutary effect on 
Gorbachev’s thinking. 173  Hungarian officials, in return, repeatedly commended Thatcher’s 
diplomacy for furthering the country’s European aspirations and for alleviating Soviet fears, so 
rendering domestic political changes irreversible. Domokos, in his annual report of 1989, made 
special mention of her part in improving relations between Britain and Hungary: 
The last five years have witnessed the most dynamic development in Anglo-Hungarian 
relations since the Second World War. Apart from objective factors [such as the political 
and economic rivalry between the major Western European states] this has been largely 
due to subjective reasons, namely Mrs Thatcher’s personal interest in Hungary and the 
Hungarian reforms.
174
 
Despite her commitment to rolling back the frontiers of socialism both at home and 
abroad, Thatcher championed a long transition and a slow evolution for the European satellite 
states. She sought to ferment change, not to foment revolution, in them. The prime minister had 
assimilated Foreign Office guidance promulgated since the 1960s that “a gentler, more 
enlightened form of authoritarian rule” was preferable to an “uncontrolled” popular uprising.175 
Moreover, she had taken the view that Britain, in dealing with Central and Eastern Europe, could 
“afford to adopt a stance independent of its partners and allies”.176 Thatcher’s unassailable anti-
communist reputation preceded her but, in the eyes of the socialist reformers behind the Iron 
Curtain, it only added to her authenticity as a leading representative of the West. In Hungary, she 
fostered closer ties with a transitional communist regime, without losing face or deterring the 
democratic forces waiting in the wings. 
 
Notes 
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